公用设施领域内,在限制供给的情况下考虑公平会导致市场失灵。描述了一份需求管理的两期委托代理契约,它可减缓城市供水系统的市场失灵问题。运用子博弈精炼纳什均衡(SPNE)作为求解概念将该契约设计成一种扩展机制。该契约是公平的。如果由代理方的用水偏差所造成的代理方利益和委托方损失都很少,它还是经济上有效的。无限期契约中不存在这种情况。 In the area of ​​utilities, fairness in the supply of supplies can lead to market failure. Describes a two-time agency contract for demand management that mitigates the market failure of urban water systems. Using sub-game refined Nash equilibrium (SPNE) as the solution concept, the contract is designed as an extension mechanism. The contract is fair. It is also economically effective if the agency’s interests and the principal’s losses due to the deviations of the water used by the agency are small. This is not the case in indefinite contracts.