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节能建筑的推广将实质性地减少我国总能耗,培育民用节能建筑市场是节能减排战略的必经途径。民用节能建筑市场本身多环节、多主体的特点违背了市场均衡之完全竞争、完全信息和完全理性的假设,即存在由正外部性、信息不对称导致的搜寻成本和逆向选择,造成市场资源配置效率低下。文章运用委托代理模型研究政府和节能建筑开发商间的委托代理关系,继而提出在委托人风险中立和代理人风险规避的情境下激励对象选择的方法和政策框架。
The promotion of energy-efficient buildings will substantially reduce China’s total energy consumption and cultivate civil energy-saving building market is the only way to energy-saving emission reduction strategy. Civilian energy-efficient construction market itself is multi-part, multi-subject characteristics are contrary to the assumption of perfect competition, complete information and perfect rationality of market equilibrium, that is, search costs and adverse selection caused by positive externality and information asymmetry result in market resource allocation low efficiency. The article uses the principal-agent model to study the principal-agent relationship between the government and the developers of energy-efficient buildings, and then puts forward the method and policy framework of incentive object selection under the circumstance of principal-neutral risk and agent-based risk aversion.