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在建筑工程领域,施工过程中的信息不对称使工程承包商为追求自身利益而与业主处于非合作的状态,而合理有效的激励机制能促使承包商与业主建立合作关系,共同促进项目的成功。利用委托-代理理论,在工程直接费与工期成非线性关系的前提下,把工程成本与工期同时作为激励因子,建立了业主对承包商在信息不对称情况下的激励模型,利用遗传算法通过算例对模型进行了求解,计算出了激励系数,最后通过多组数据的实验,得到了分别影响成本与工期激励系数的因素及其影响趋势,并通过与工程的实际情况对比有效地验证了所建模型的合理性。
In the field of construction engineering, the information asymmetry during the construction process makes the construction contractor non-cooperative with the owner for the pursuit of own interests, and the reasonable and effective incentive mechanism can promote the cooperation between the contractor and the owner to promote the success of the project . Using the principal-agent theory, under the premise of direct nonlinear relationship between project direct costs and construction period, the project cost and construction period are taken as the incentive factors at the same time, and the incentive model of the contractor under the asymmetric information of the contractor is established. The genetic algorithm The example is used to solve the model, and the incentive coefficient is calculated. Finally, through the experiment of multiple sets of data, the factors that affect the cost and duration incentive coefficient are respectively obtained and their influence trends are obtained. By comparing with the actual situation of the project, The rationality of the model built.