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电力市场中最优竞标可描述成一个两层优化问题,其中在下层优化中ISO通过求解最优潮流(OPF)问题来最大化社会效益,而在上层优化中,电力供应商(发电商)通过线性供应函数竞标来最大化各自利润。线路传输容量约束将导致电力供应商决策空间分成不同区域,在任一决策区域内约束状态严格不变(或为严格等式,或为严格不等式)。而不同决策区域内约束状态不同又导致电力供应商在不同区域内有相应不同的最优策略。从市场均衡定义出发,通过在不同决策区域中搜索发电供应商最优响应曲线的交点来定位市场均衡点。文中首先研究一个简单的3节点系统,发现线路传输容量约束的引入导致市场可能有一段连续的均衡点,或是不存在均衡点;且如果均衡点存在,那么只能在约束边界式上发现,即不存在节点电价差或不存在网络拥塞费用。通过分析上述结论的内在因素,将其推广到复杂系统中。算例检验表明了文中分析的正确性。
Optimal bidding in the electricity market can be described as a two-tier optimization problem, in which ISO optimizes social benefits by solving the optimal power flow (OPF) problem in lower-level optimization, whereas in upper-level optimization, the electricity supplier (power producer) Linear supply function bidding to maximize their respective profits. The constraints of line transmission capacity will result in the power supplier’s decision-making space being divided into different regions, and the constraint states are strictly unchanged (either strictly or strictly inequalities) in any decision region. However, different constraint states in different decision-making regions lead to different optimal strategies for power suppliers in different regions. Starting from the definition of market equilibrium, the market equilibrium point is determined by searching the intersection of the optimal response curves of generation suppliers in different decision regions. Firstly, we study a simple 3-node system and find that the introduction of transmission capacity constraints leads to a continuous equilibrium or a non-equilibrium point in the market. If the equilibrium point exists, it can only be found on the bounding boundary. That is, there is no node price difference or there is no network congestion costs. By analyzing the internal factors of the above conclusion, it is extended to complex systems. The example test shows the correctness of the analysis.