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在中国式分权体制下,地方政府掌握着大量行政处置权和公共资源,诱使企业积极发展政治联系。一方面,政治关联在一定程度上帮助企业,尤其是民企获得实际的产权保护和廉价的公共资源,突破各种管制和进入壁垒,从而赢得更加有利的生存和发展空间,因此具有一定的积极意义。然而,另一方面,政治关联不仅会抑制企业核心竞争力的建设和公司治理结构的完善,而且还会导致租金的耗散和不公平竞争,从而不利于企业和国民经济长远的健康发展。为此,产权改革、放松(所有制歧视性)管制、强化市场竞争机制都将有效地抑制政治关联的作用。
Under the Chinese decentralization system, local governments hold a large amount of administrative disposition rights and public resources to induce enterprises to actively develop political ties. On the one hand, political affiliation helps to some extent enterprises, especially private enterprises, to obtain actual property rights protection and cheap public resources, break through all kinds of control and barriers to entry, and thus win more favorable opportunities for survival and development. Therefore, it has some positive significance . However, on the other hand, political connections not only inhibit the construction of core competitiveness of enterprises and the improvement of corporate governance structure, but also lead to the dissipation of rent and unfair competition, which is not conducive to the long-term healthy development of enterprises and national economy. To this end, property rights reform, relaxation (ownership of discriminatory) control, strengthen market competition mechanisms will effectively inhibit the role of political relations.