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德性伦理学是基于人的实践可能性的对人的善生活的哲学说明。德性的观点表明一种基本的真实:德性地生活对于人始终是一种可能性。德性伦理学比其他实质性的伦理学更明确地诉诸这个可能性前提。对这个基础的说明只有借助对心灵整体及其历史两个相互联系的基本前提要素的理解才有可能。这些相互联系的观点内涵对人的实践性活动的身心一致的解释,构成一种内德性的、内德性伦理学的观点。这种内在观点的缺乏引向强硬分割心灵而在理解实践活动时不能“复原”其整体性的倾向。整体心灵的历史性也由此丧失。被剥夺掉其实践生命内容的“心”被抽象为agency,作为功能性对照物的“身”也成为消极的、不确定的实践心灵的抽象符号。基于这种方法与观点的“德性伦理学”讨论不是恰当的德性伦理学讨论。它没有抓住真实。
Virtue ethics is a philosophical explanation of the good life of human beings based on human possibilities of practice. The virtuous point of view shows a basic truth: living in virtue is always a possibility. Ethical ethics resorts more explicitly to this probable premise than other substantive ethics. The explanation of this foundation is only possible with the understanding of two essential preconditions that relate to the whole of the soul and its history. These inter-related connotations of the connotation of physical and mental interpretation of the practical activities of people, constitute a nevus, ethical ethics point of view. The lack of such internal views leads to a hard-line division of mind that can not “restore” its general tendencies in understanding practical activities. The historicity of the whole soul is thus lost. The “heart” that is deprived of the content of his practical life is abstracted as an agency, and the “body” as a functional reference also becomes the abstract symbol of a negative and indefinable practical mind. The discussion of “ethical ethics” based on this method and perspective is not an appropriate ethical discussion of ethics. It did not grasp the truth.