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内生地考虑三寡头市场垄断力的不同情形,基于Salop环形城市模型,首先研究不同博弈构式下基于单一价格策略的差异化策略,接着分析企业对歧视定价策略的选择。研究表明:企业实施单一定价策略时,Bertrand-Nash博弈均衡为三企业之间遵循最大差异化原则,均匀分布于整个市场;而Bertrand-Stackelberg博弈达到均衡时,Salop模型退化为Hotelling模型,表现为两个挑战企业发生集聚,与领导企业分别居于线段的两端,而且领导企业更愿争取先动优势,作价格制定的领导者而不是追随者。当实施歧视定价策略时,企业利润明显提高,对产品差异化和价格决策先行权的依赖缓解,三企业选择歧视定价的意愿均增强。
Considering the different situations of oligopolistic markets endogenously, based on Salop’s circular city model, we first study the differentiation strategy based on single price strategy under different game structure, and then analyze the choice of the firm’s pricing strategy. The research shows that when the firm implements a single pricing strategy, the Bertrand-Nash game equilibrium is that the three firms follow the principle of maximum difference and distribute evenly throughout the market. When the game of Bertrand-Stackelberg reaches equilibrium, the Salop model degenerates into Hotelling model, The two challenged enterprises clustered, and the leading companies resided at the two ends of the line segment, and the leading enterprises preferred to take the first mover advantage as the price-setting leader rather than the follower. When the discriminative pricing strategy is implemented, the profits of the enterprises are obviously increased, the dependence on the product differentiation and the right to prioritize the price decisions is alleviated, and the willingness of the three enterprises to choose the discriminatory pricing increases.