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围绕代理人逆向选择导致委托人无法直接识别代理人类型状态,研究真实状态下委托人契约实施惟一性问题。分析讨论了完全信息下委托人的最优契约和逆向选择下的次优契约,建立了信号空间上的纳什均衡与有效配置的映射关系,并推广到逆向选择问题中的类型空间,将委托人契约与代理人状态联系起来,最后研究分析委托人契约纳什实施惟一性问题。研究表明,委托人提供的完全信息下最优契约不具备纳什实施惟一性,而满足代理人激励相容约束的次优契约具备纳什实施的惟一性,并为合理、有效的激励契约设计提供了检验途径。
Surrogate agents around the adverse selection led to the principal can not directly identify the type of agent status, the study under the real conditions of the client to implement the uniqueness of the problem. The optimal contract under the complete information and the suboptimal contract under adverse selection are analyzed and discussed. The mapping between Nash equilibrium and effective allocation in signal space is established and extended to the type space in the adverse selection problem. The principal Contract and agent status, the final study and analysis of the client contract Nash implementation of the uniqueness of the problem. The research shows that under the complete information provided by the principal, the optimal contract does not have the uniqueness of Nash’s implementation, while the subordinate contract that satisfies the agent-compatible constraint possesses the uniqueness of Nash’s implementation and provides a reasonable and effective incentive contract design Test route.