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在《纯粹理性批判》中,康德阐明对经验对象之认知的先验条件,而经验对象被主要视为不同于认知主体的占有空间的对象。在康德研究中,康德的经验认知理论被怀疑不能适用于一个主体对其心灵状态(比如其信念、欲求、意向等)的认知。在本论文中,我论证康德的理论确实提供了相关的理论资源去解释这种经验性的自我知识——一个人对自己心灵状态的知识——的可能性。我之论证依靠区分两种将心灵状态归属于自我的方式:一种是将心灵状态归属于作为逻辑主体的自我;一种是将心灵状态归属于作为经验—时间性主体的自我。前者产生于对外在对象和自我认知的一般先验条件,即被康德的“我思”所表达出的统觉之先验统一。与之不同,后者反映了仅对自我的认知有效的特殊条件。因此,我将论证,后者要求一个比统觉之先验统一更苛刻的意识统一的概念。
In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant clarifies the prior condition of the cognition of the object of experience, while the object of experience is mainly regarded as the object of possession space different from that of the cognitive subject. In Kant’s research, Kant’s theory of empirical cognition is suspected to not apply to the cognition of a subject about his state of mind (such as his beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). In this paper, I argue that Kant’s theory does provide the theoretical resources to explain the possibility of this empirical self-knowledge - a person’s knowledge of his or her state of mind. My argument relies on a distinction between two ways of attributing the state of mind to the ego: one is to attribute the state of mind to the self as the logical subject; the other is to attribute the state of mind to the ego as an empirical-temporal subject. The former arises from the general a priori condition of external object and self-cognition, that is, the prior unity of the feeling expressed by Kant’s “I think.” In contrast, the latter reflects special conditions that are valid only for self. Therefore, I will argue that the latter requires a more unified concept of unity of consciousness than priori unity of sensations.