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在治理均衡观下,引入独立董事表现为公司因道德风险而对外部监督的依赖。以2002年至2004年中国的A股上市公司为研究样本,本文发现股权过于集中会削弱业务复杂度和独立董事行业监督力之间的均衡,使得两者间的正相关关系仅仅存在于大股东受到相对制衡的公司。结论暗示在中国的资本市场,股权制衡能够促使公司依据道德风险变差来设置监督机制,以保证机会主义在复杂环境下的发现概率。
Under the balanced view of governance, the introduction of independent directors shows the company’s dependence on external oversight due to moral hazard. Taking the Chinese A-share listed companies from 2002 to 2004 as the research sample, this paper finds that the over-concentration of equity will weaken the balance between business complexity and the independent directors’ industry supervision, making the positive correlation between the two only exist in the major shareholders By the relative checks and balances of the company. The conclusion implies that in China’s capital market, equity checks and balances can prompt the company to set up a monitoring mechanism based on the deterioration of moral hazard so as to ensure the probability of opportunism discovery in a complex environment.