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本文以我国2004-2010年沪深A股非金融上市公司为样本,基于上市公司所在地区的市场化进程和所处行业的竞争程度,检验管理者权力对资本投资价值的影响。研究发现,管理者权力与资本投资价值负相关;上市公司所在地区的市场化进程能够减弱管理者权力对资本投资价值的负面影响;与处于完全竞争行业的公司相比,处于保护性行业的上市公司中,管理者权力对资本投资价值的负面影响更显著。
Based on the marketization process of the listed companies in the region where the listed companies are located and the degree of competition in the industries in which they are located, this paper examines the impact of managers’ power on the value of capital investment. The study found that managers ’rights are negatively correlated with the value of capital investment. The marketization process in the region where listed companies are located can weaken the negative impact of managers’ power on the value of capital investment. Compared with companies in a completely competitive industry, they are listed in the protection industry In the company, the negative impact of manager power on the value of capital investment is even more pronounced.