在最近几年中许多美国公司急剧提高了他们的融资杠杆。同时以公司控制权为目的的交易规模和数量达到高峰。在这篇论文中我提出一种将这两个看似无关的问题联系起来的理论。我认为当存在潜在收购方的时候,被收购方将会发行无投票权的风险证券(例如,风险债务)以使预期的目标公司价值最大化。 In recent years, many U.S. companies have sharply increased their financing leverage. At the same time, the scale and number of transactions for the purpose of corporate control reached a peak. In this paper I propose a theory that links these two seemingly unrelated questions. I think that when there is a potential acquirer, the acquiree will issue non-voting risky securities (such as risky debt) to maximize the value of the intended target company.