目前,经营者激励机制研究通常以净收益为业绩标准,采用固定基础薪酬制度,且大多数局限于薪酬激励。本文以价值创造为业绩标准,采用动态基础薪酬制度,将薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合设计经营者激励模型,在传统委托代理模型基础上得出如下三点结论:第一,实行动态基础薪酬制度可以有效提升经营者努力水平;第二,经营者激励应采用薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合的手段,并依据非薪酬激励敏感度灵活设计二者的组合比例;第三,垄断行业经营者努力水平低于竞争性行业,需要引入竞争机制。 At present, the study of incentive mechanism of managers usually adopts net income as performance standard, adopts fixed basic salary system, and most of them are limited to salary incentive. In this paper, the value creation as the performance criteria, the use of dynamic basis of the compensation system, the incentive and non-incentive pay incentives combined with the design of incentive models, based on the traditional principal-agent model to draw the following three conclusions: First, the implementation of dynamic based compensation System can effectively enhance the level of managers’ efforts; secondly, managers should use the combination of remuneration incentives and non-remuneration incentives, and flexibly design the combination ratio of non-remuneration incentive sensitivity; thirdly, monopoly operators Efforts below the competitive level of competition, the need to introduce competition mechanisms.