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管理层收购作为20世纪90年代末国有企业改革的重要方式之一,受到了学术界和实务界的广泛关注,但以往研究多是基于股权分置的背景。本文以羚锐制药在股权分置改革之后进行的管理层收购为例,从管理层和大股东两个层面,多维度剖析公司在管理层收购后的资本运作状况,进一步结合公司财务绩效和股价市场表现分析其经济后果。研究发现,羚锐制药在管理层收购后,管理层与外部股东之间的代理问题有所减弱,公司价值有所提升。股权分置改革完成后,管理层收购较好地协调了管理层与外部中小股东的利益,对管理层起到激励作用,公司业绩提升,中小股东利益得到有效保护。本文的研究结论为全流通时代管理层收购激励效应提供了证据支持,为新一轮国企改革提供决策依据。
As one of the most important ways to reform state-owned enterprises in the late 1990s, MBO received widespread attention from academics and practitioners. However, previous studies mostly focused on the background of the split share structure. This article takes Lingrui Pharmaceutical’s management buy-out after the non-tradable share reform as an example to analyze the capital operation of the company after the management buy-out from two aspects of management and major shareholder, and further combine the company’s financial performance and stock price Market performance analysis of its economic consequences. The study found that after Lingrui acquired the management, agency problems between the management and external shareholders weakened, and the value of the company increased. After the split share structure reform is completed, the MBO better coordinated the interests of the management and the outside small and medium shareholders, played an incentive role for the management, improved the performance of the company and effectively protected the interests of minority shareholders. The conclusion of this paper provides evidence support for the motivation of MBO in the circulation era and provides decision-making basis for the new round of SOE reform.