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风险投资历来是学者们关注的焦点。本文以博弈论为理论依据,建立了创业者与风险投资者之间的三阶段动态博弈模型,并分析了不同阶段下两者之间的博弈结果,分别得出了风险投资者提出合作意向的约束条件和创业者努力工作的激励相容条件和参与约束条件。
Venture capital has always been the focus of scholars. Based on game theory, this paper establishes a three-stage dynamic game model between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and analyzes the game results between the two stages under different stages. The author draws the conclusion that venture capital investors propose cooperation intention Incentive Compatibility and Involuntary Constraints of Constraints and Entrepreneurs’ Hard Work.