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现代哲学中凸显的“意向性”主题据说发端于布伦塔诺。他以“意向的内存在”为基本依据区分“物理现象”与“心识现象”。然而,他并未将“意向的”主题化和术语化,它可被“对象的”替换。如果从布伦塔诺特定的经验立场出发,拥有“意向的内存在”的心识现象同时具有真实的存在,而物理现象只有意向的存在,常识现象只有超越的存在。三种现象中,只有对心识现象方可作出明证判断。“意向的”在现象学中向“意向性”主题转变表明哲学或是对实践问题作出退让,或是陷入玄虚;在语言分析哲学中向“意向性”主题转变则表明哲学或是对语言或是对常识作出退让。
The “intentional” theme highlighted in modern philosophy is said to have originated in Brentano. He divided “physical phenomena ” and “mental phenomena ” based on “memory of intention ”. However, he did not thematicize and terminate “intentions ”, which could be replaced by “objects ”. From the specific experience of Brentano, there is a real existence of the mental phenomenon of possessing “intention memory”, while the physical phenomenon only has the intention and the common sense phenomenon only exists beyond it. Among the three phenomena, only a clear judgment can be made on the phenomenon of the mind. “Intention ” in phenomenology to “Intentionality ” theme shows that philosophy either made a concession to practical problems, or fell into a mystery; in linguistic analysis philosophy to “intentionality ” theme shows Philosophy either gives way to language or common sense.