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一、理论背景企业绩效是企业公司治理水平和经营管理能力的集中反映,事关股权所有者的投资收益。国内外大量研究表明,股权配置特征在一定程度上决定了企业的公司治理结构,对企业决策行为和企业绩效都有重要影响。Berle和Means(1932)认为当企业股权配置分散时,大股东监督经理人的能力弱,监督效应不显著,而小股东缺乏监督的动力,存在搭便车的倾向,从而导致经理人可能出于自身利益的考虑做出不利于企业绩效的决策,产生了股权所有
First, the theoretical background Corporate performance is a concentrated reflection of the level of corporate governance and management capabilities, related to equity investors return on investment. A large number of studies at home and abroad show that the characteristics of equity allocation to a certain extent determine the corporate governance structure of enterprises, which has an important impact on the decision-making behavior and corporate performance of enterprises. Berle and Means (1932) argue that when the allocation of corporate equity is dispersed, the large shareholders’ ability to supervise the managers is weak and the supervisory effect is not significant. However, the minority shareholders lack the motivation to supervise and there is a tendency of hitchhiking, which may result in the managers being out of their own Consideration of interests Make decisions that are detrimental to business performance and generate ownership of the equity