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基于碳排放量具有动态性,两国政府可采取单边碳税政策或碳税合作政策,两国企业可选择独立低碳技术研发或低碳技术研发合作,构建了政府与企业相互博弈的三阶段博弈模型,求出了线性反馈策略的纳什均衡解,再选取不同的低碳技术研发溢出率,对政府碳税政策和企业低碳技术研发形式的低碳技术研发效应和环境效应进行了数值模拟.结果表明:若企业不分享低碳技术研发成果,低碳技术研发合作和碳税合作政策均不能产生长久的低碳技术研发效应和环境效应,只有碳税合作政策能在短期内产生明显的低碳技术研发效应;若企业共享低碳技术研发成果,低碳技术研发合作和碳税合作政策分别有明显的低碳技术研发效应和环境效应,只有在单边碳税政策下低碳技术研发合作才有明显的环境效应,碳税合作政策只在短期内具有明显的低碳技术研发效应;在既定的低碳技术研发形式和碳税政策下,低碳技术研发溢出率越高,环境效应越明显.
Based on the dynamics of carbon emissions, the two governments may adopt a unilateral carbon tax policy or a carbon tax cooperation policy. Enterprises in both countries may choose to independently research and develop low-carbon technologies or low-carbon technologies and develop cooperation between the government and enterprises. Stage game model, the Nash equilibrium solution of linear feedback strategy is obtained, and then the R & D spillover rate of different low-carbon technologies is selected to research the R & D effects and environmental effects of low-carbon technology in the form of government carbon tax policy and R & D of low- Simulation results show that if the enterprises do not share the R & D results of low-carbon technologies, the low-carbon R & D cooperation and carbon tax cooperation policies can not produce long-term R & D and environmental effects of low-carbon technology, only carbon tax cooperation policy can be obvious in the short term Low-carbon technology R & D effect; if companies share R & D results of low-carbon technology, low-carbon technology R & D cooperation and carbon tax cooperation policies have significant research and development of low-carbon technology and environmental effects, only under the carbon tax unilateral carbon technology R & D cooperation have obvious environmental effects, carbon tax cooperation policy only in the short term has obvious low carbon technology research and development effect; in the established low carbon Under a carbon tax form and technique development policy, the higher the rate of low carbon technology R & D spillovers, the more obvious environmental effect.