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文章使用2004-2013年我国国有上市公司数据,考察了国有企业金字塔层级如何影响经理激励契约,以及这种影响在不同政治关联的情况下是否存在差异。研究发现,国有企业的金字塔层级越长,经理薪酬与会计业绩的相关性越强,经理更可能因糟糕的会计业绩而被更换;同时,在经理没有政治关联的样本中,上述现象更加明显。上述结果说明,国有企业金字塔结构是政府放权的一种制度安排,降低了国有企业面临的政治成本。但文章也发现,对于业绩良好的企业,金字塔层级过长可能导致经理拥有过度权力,从而出现操纵薪酬的现象。文章的发现对于深化国有企业改革具有重要的政策含义。
Using the data of China’s state-owned listed companies from 2004 to 2013, this article examines how the pyramid level of state-owned enterprises affects the manager’s incentive contract and whether there is any difference in this kind of influence under different political connections. The study found that the longer the pyramid level of state-owned enterprises, the stronger the correlation between managers’ remuneration and accounting performance, the more likely managers are to be replaced by poor accounting performance, and the more obvious is the phenomenon in the sample that managers have no political connection. The above results show that the pyramid structure of state-owned enterprises is a kind of institutional arrangement for the delegation of power by the government and reduces the political costs faced by state-owned enterprises. But the article also found that for well-performing companies, the pyramid level too long may lead to managers have excessive power, resulting in manipulation of pay phenomenon. The discovery of the article has important policy implications for deepening SOE reform.