论文部分内容阅读
在建筑工程领域,施工过程中的信息不对称使工程承包商为追求自身利益而与业主处于非合作的状态,只有合理有效的激励机制才能使承包商与业主建立合作关系,共同促进项目的成功。利用委托-代理理论,把施工成本与工期同时作为激励因子,以业主的期望效用为目标函数,建立业主对承包商在信息不对称情况下的激励模型,求解出均衡状态下的激励系数,并分析影响成本与工期激励系数的因素及其影响趋势,为业主设计合理有效的激励合同提供了依据。
In the field of construction engineering, the information asymmetry during the construction process makes the construction contractor non-cooperative with the owner for the pursuit of own interests. Only a reasonable and effective incentive mechanism can establish the cooperation between the contractor and the owner to jointly promote the success of the project . Using the principal-agent theory, the construction cost and construction period are taken as the incentive factors at the same time, the expected utility of the owner is taken as the objective function, and the incentive model of the contractor under the information asymmetry condition is established. The incentive coefficient under the equilibrium condition is obtained. Analysis of the factors that affect the cost and schedule incentive coefficient and its impact trend provide the basis for the owners to design a reasonable and effective incentive contract.