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通过把控股股东代理的影响内生到实物期权模型中,分析了控股股东代理对负债代理成本的影响.研究结果认为,控股股东的存在加大了债权人与股东之间的信息不对称程度、提高了负债融资的代理成本,并导致企业过早投资.随着控股股东现金流权的提高,负债融资代理成本逐渐降低,表明控股股东对公司治理具有激励效应;随着控股股东现金流权和控制权分离程度的加大,资产替代问题变得更加严重,表现为负债代理成本逐渐提高,表明控股股东对公司治理具有侵占效应.
By analyzing the impact of the controlling shareholder’s agency on the real option model, the influence of the controlling shareholder’s agency on the liability agency cost is analyzed.The result shows that the existence of the controlling shareholder increases the degree of information asymmetry between the creditor and the shareholder, The agency costs of debt financing and lead to premature investment.As the cash flow right of controlling shareholders increased, the cost of debt financing agency gradually decreased, indicating that the controlling shareholder has an incentive effect on corporate governance. With the controlling shareholder cash flow rights and control As the degree of separation of powers increases, the problem of asset replacement becomes more serious. The cost of agency for liabilities gradually increases, indicating that the controlling shareholders have an encroachment effect on corporate governance.