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在成功的市场经济中,个体在经济交往中是选择公共秩序还是选择私立秩序进行治理,大体上依赖于交易的信息条件所导致的交易成本。但是在转型经济中,受原权力集中型计划经济体系的持续影响,一个很重要的特征就是不同经济个体在使用公共秩序时的机会和成本是不对等的,即在转型经济体中公共秩序和私立秩序是相分离的二元治理结构。本文试图对这种二元结构的特征进行一个归纳和分析,并在此基础上提出转型的瓶颈问题,同时对中国在转型过程中的特殊性进行重点剖析。
In a successful market economy, whether an individual chooses public order or private order in economic exchanges depends on the transaction costs caused by the information conditions of the transaction. However, in a transitional economy, under the continuous influence of a centrally planned economy, it is an important feature that the opportunities and costs of different economic entities in using public order are unequal, that is, in the transition economies, public order and Private order is a dualistic structure of governance. This article tries to summarize and analyze the characteristics of this binary structure. Based on this, I put forward the bottleneck of the transformation, and at the same time, I analyze the particularity of China in the transition process.