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本文选用2006年至2014年我国沪深A股上市的企业为研究对象,分析了企业投资机会集和企业过度投资之间的关联性、企业会计信息质量和企业会计审计之间的关联性。研究表明:企业投资机会集越大,企业存在的信息不对称和代理冲突将更为严重,为了降低就业风险,提升自己的薪酬水平,企业管理人员将更倾向于进行过度投资。当企业具有高质量会计信息时,企业投资机会集和企业过度投资行为之间的正向关联关系将减弱。
This article chooses the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2006 to 2014 as the research object, and analyzes the correlation between the investment opportunities and the overinvestment, the quality of the accounting information and the accounting auditing. The research shows that the larger the investment opportunities, the more information asymmetry and agency conflict will exist in enterprises. In order to reduce the employment risk and raise their salary level, the managers of enterprises will be more inclined to over-invest. When enterprises have high-quality accounting information, the positive relationship between the set of investment opportunities in enterprises and over-investment in enterprises will be weakened.