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以2008~2015年上市公司为研究对象,在“现金流—成长机会”框架下,理论分析与实证检验了不同现金持有动机对过度投资的影响,以及内部控制在其间的调节作用。研究发现:相对于预防性动机,代理动机下的现金持有更容易导致企业过度投资行为,这种现象在内部控制存在缺陷的企业表现更为明显,当企业内部控制缺陷修复后又能有效抑制过度投资行为。进一步加入股权结构分离度研究发现,相对于预防性动机而言,股权结构分离度的降低有助于减弱代理动机下持有现金对过度投资的负效应。
Taking the listed companies from 2008 to 2015 as the research object, under the framework of “cash flow - growth opportunity ”, the theoretical analysis and empirical test of the impact of different cash holding motives on overinvestment and the role of internal control in the process. The study found that, compared with the preventive motivation, the cash holding under the motivation of agents is more likely to lead to over-investment, which is more obvious in the enterprises with defects in internal control and can be effectively restrained when the internal control defects are repaired Over-investment behavior. Further study on the ownership structure separation shows that the decrease of ownership structure separation helps to reduce the negative effect of cash holding on overinvestment under the agent motivation, relative to the preventive motivation.