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2013年以来,跨国公司主导的价格合谋和价格歧视受到了中国反垄断机构的调查和处罚。文章以汽车配件行业中“日资企业”的价格垄断案为线索,构建了一个纵向股权关联下投入品价格合谋和集团内转移定价的理论模型,通过静态比较分析发现:关联企业之间的价格投标合谋并不符合“利润最大化”的目标,而是跨国公司作为实际控制人在上下游股权比例和盈利能力不对等的条件下,将下游整车合资企业的利润转移到上游配件企业的一种手段。文章从股权比例和企业运营模式的层面论证了利润转移假说的合意性,并结合主要细分市场的结构和利润关系,对“结构-合谋”原理所面临的现实矛盾进行了深入分析。文章的主要政策建议是:中国汽车产业的反垄断立法要实现从行为惩罚到规则干预的转化,要适当增加产业组织分析的证据以提高执法的科学水准,需要更多地使用合理推定原则以避免对企业理性行为的不当干预。
Since 2013, the collusion and price discrimination led by multinational corporations have been investigated and punished by China’s antitrust agencies. Taking the price monopoly case of “Japanese company” in the auto parts industry as a clue, the article constructs a theoretical model of price collusion and intra-group transfer pricing under the longitudinal equity correlation. Through the static comparative analysis, it finds that between the affiliated enterprises The bidding collusion does not meet the goal of “maximizing profit”. Instead, MNCs, as the actual controllers, transfer the profits of the downstream vehicle joint ventures to the upstream under the condition that the proportion of upstream and downstream equity and the profitability are not equal, Accessories business as a means. The paper proves the desirability of the profit transfer hypothesis from the aspect of equity ratio and business operation mode. Based on the structure and profit relationship of the major market segments, the article makes an in-depth analysis of the actual contradictions faced by the principle of “structure-collusion”. The main policy recommendations of the article are as follows: The antitrust legislation of China’s automobile industry must realize the transformation from behavioral punishment to regulatory intervention. Appropriately, the evidence of industrial organization analysis should be appropriately increased so as to enhance the scientific level of law enforcement. More reasonable presumptions should be used to avoid Improper intervention in corporate rational behavior.