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分析了军品包装生产参与主体,构建了监管人员与生产厂家之间交互过程演化博弈模型,利用数值仿真对不同参数下系统演化稳定策略(Evolutionarily Stable Strategy,ESS)的演化趋势进行了仿真分析。研究结果表明:通过调整生产厂家和监管人员的激励与处罚策略,拓展反馈渠道,可有效地影响系统的收敛结果,从而引导生产厂家和监管人员的行为选择朝着期望的方向和预定的目标进行,为促进军品包装生产质量和军品防护能力的提升提供参考。
The participants of the military packaging production are analyzed. An evolutionary game model of interaction between supervisors and manufacturers is established. The evolutionary trend of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) under different parameters is simulated by numerical simulation. The results show that: by adjusting the incentives and penalties of manufacturers and supervisors, and expanding feedback channels, the results of system convergence can be effectively influenced so as to guide the behavior choices of manufacturers and regulators toward the desired direction and the intended target , To provide reference for promoting the quality of military package production and the enhancement of military defense capability.