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电力市场研究中,一个重要的课题是如何预测和分析一个给定市场设计的性能。文中在假设各机组边际成本相同的基础上,建立了电力市场价格竞争的双层优化模型。分析了在按发电方报价结算(PAB)电价机制容量强约束和弱约束条件下的Nash均衡,并进一步与市场清算电价(MCP)机制进行对比,从理论上得到在容量紧张时,PAB机制下电价波动小、平均电价高,而MCP机制下电价波动大、平均电价低的结论。
An important issue in power market research is how to predict and analyze the performance of a given market design. Based on the assumption of the same marginal cost of each unit, a bi-level optimization model of electricity market price competition is established. This paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium under the condition of strong capacity constraints and weak constraints on electricity price quotation (PAB) pricing mechanism and further compares with the market clearing price (MCP) mechanism. Theoretically, under the PAB mechanism, Small fluctuations in electricity prices, the average high electricity prices, and the MCP mechanism volatility of electricity prices, the average low price conclusion.